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INTRODUCTION
r
The STS-64 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload activities
as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Redesigned
Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) systems
performance during the sixty-fourth flight of the Space Shuttle Program and the
nineteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Discovery (OV-I03). In addition to the Orbiter,
the flight vehicle consisted of an ET that was designated ET-66; three SSMEs that were
designated as serial numbers 2031,2109, and 2029 in positions 1,2, and 3,
respectively; and two SRBs that were designated BI-068. The RSRM's that Were
installect in each SRB were designated as 3601.041A for the left SRB, and 360L041B
for the right SRB.
This STS-64 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle Program
requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E. The
requirement stated in that document is that each major organizational element
supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware and software evaluation
and mission performance, plus identify all re_ated in-flight anomalies.
The primary objective of this flight was to successfully perform the planned operations
of the Lidar In-Space Technology Experiment (LITE), and to deploy the Shuttle Pointed
Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy (SPARTAN) -201 payload. The secondary
objectives were to perform the planned activities of the Robot Operated Materials
Processing System (ROMPS), the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment - il (SAREX-ll),
the Solid Surface Combustion Experiment (SSCE), the Biological Research in
Canisters (BRIC) experiment, the Radiation Monitoring Equipment-Ill (RME,III)
payload, the Military Application of Ship Tracks (MAST) experiment, and the Air Force
Maul Optical Site Calibration Test (AMOS) payload.
The STS-64 mission was planned with a 9-day duration plus 1 extension day plus 2
contingency days, which were available for weather avoidance ol Orbiter contingency
operations, The Sequence of events for the STS-64 mission is shown in Table I, and
the Orbiter Project Office Problem Tracking List is shown in Table I!. The official
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table i11,
and the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Problem Tracking List is shown in Table
IV. In addition, the integration and payload in-flight an0ma!ies are referenced in
applicable section8 of the report. Appendix A lists the SOurces Of data, both formal and
informal, that were used in the preparation ot this report. Appef_dix B provides the
definition of acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. All times are given in
Greenwich mean time (G. m. t.) as well as mission elapsed time (MET).
The six-person Crew for STS,P ._.consisted Of Richard N. Richards, Capt., U. S. Navy,
C0mmander; Blaine L. Hammond, C01., U. S. Air Force, Pilot; Jerry M. Linenger, M. D.,
Ph. D., Cdr., Medical Corps, U. S. Navy, Mission Specialist 1; Susan J. Helms, Lt. Col,
U. S. Air Force, Mission Specialist 2; Carl J. Meade, Col., U. S. Air Force, Mission
Specialist 3; and Mark C. Lee, Col., U. S. Air Force, Mission Specialist 4. STS-64 was
the fourth space flight for the Commander, the third flight for Mission Specialist 3 and
Mission Specialist 4; the second space flight for the PilOt arid Mission Specialist 2; and
the first space flight for Mission Specialist 1.
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MISSION SUMMARY
The STS-64 Space Shuttle Vehicle was launched successfully on a 57-degree launch
azimuth at 252:22:22:54.982 G.m.t., 1 hour, 52 minutes, and 55 seconds later than
planned because of unsatisfactory weather in the Return-to-Launch-Site (RTLS)
landing area. All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and the
launch phase performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent
performance was as expected. SRB separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact
occurred as anticipated. Both SRBs were recovered. Performance of the SSMEs, ET,
and main propt=lsion system (MPS) was normal. The Orbiter ascent performance was
also nominal with the planned orbit of 137 by 23 nmi, achieved at main engine cutoff
(MECO). S-band communications were lost for four minutes after MECO during the
handover from Wallops Island to the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS).
Analysis shows that this loss of communications was not Caused by the Orbiter vehicle
subsystems. Postflight troubleshooting of the TDRS network was performed to
determine the cause of the unexpected loss of signal (LOS).
No orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) -1 maneuver was required because of the
satisfactory direct insertion trajectory flown. The OMS-2 maneuver was initiated at
252:22:59:03.8 G.m.t. (00:36:04.8 MET). The maneuver was 125.4 seconds in duration
with a differential velocity (&V) of 208.7 ftleec. The orbit achieved as a result of this
maneuver was 140.8 by 139.9 nmi.
The SSME vacuum inerti._g process was initiated by the OI-23 software. A predicted
pressure rise of approximately 30 psi in the hydrogen manifold was exceeded by
approximately 3 psi. This was similar to the previous flight of OI-23 software on
STS-65, although the pressure rise was greater on this flight. Because of this pressure
rise, the crew manually performed a second vacuum-inerting procedure.
A determination of overall Space Vehicle performance during ascent was made using
vehicle acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the
average flight-dr _'ved engine Isp, determined for the period between SRB separation
and start of 3g throttling, was 452,5 seconds, and that value was very near the planned
level.
Payload bay door (PLBD) operations were delayed due to the motor controller
assembly (MCA) logic Main C Mid 4 switch being Off. Data indicate the switch WaS
m_ved tO off at 252:23:39 G.m.t. (00:01:17' MET). The crew restored the switch to on at
252:2,3:44 G.m.t. (00:01:22 MET), and tl_e door opening Operations were completed
with no further delay at 252:23:53:36 G.m.t. (00:01:30_41 MET).
During a_ent, at_xiliary power units (APUs) 1, 2 and 3 operated for 21 minutes
26 Sec0_ids, 21 minutes 31 seconds, and 21 minutes 17 seconds With fuel usages of
54, 59, and 56 Ib, respectively. The APUs were shutdown in the order (3-1-2) desired
to fulfill the requirements of Development Test Objective (DTO) 414, APU Shutdown
Test (Sequence A). Analysis of the data from the shutdown sequence revealed no
back-driving of the power drive units (PDUs).
Following the completion of post-insertion procedures, the crew reported that the side-
hatch locking device could not be installed because of an obstruction. The crew
downlinked video of the area involved, and analysis of the video did not clearly show
the cause of the obstruction. Posfflight inspection and analysis showed that the locking
device was oversized when compared tO the drawing. This particular unit had not been
flown previously; consequently, this error had not been found.
Two reaction control subsystem (RCS) trim firings were performed with nominal
subsystem operation. The first RCS trim firing was initiated at 253:02:45:25 G.m.t.
(00:04:22:31 MET) using multiple tl',,rusters. The firing was 5 seconds in duration with a
_V of 1.4 ft/sec. The second firing was initiated at 253:03:33:09 G.m.t.
(00:05:10:15 MET) using multiple thrusters. The +Z maneuver was approximately
10 seconds in duration with a AV of 3.7 ft/sec.
The crew reported that an advanced felt reusable surface insulation (AFRSI) blanket on
the port OMS pod was partially detached near the AFRSI/Iow temperature reusable
surface insulation (LRSI) interface. Downlinked video provided a detailed view of the
AFRSI blanket damage. A small triangular tear in the blanket coating about 2 in. by
0.75 in. was seen at the interface between the tiles and the blanket. The batting
beneath the torn cloth appeared to be intact. Similar damages to this particular blanket
have occurred (ref. STS-50, OV-102, LP05), with no resulting damage to the underlying
structure. The blanket is through-stitched on 1 in. centers to ensure that cover damage
of this nature is minimized. The blanket damage seen in this view did not represent an
on-orbit or entry concern.
The third RCS trim firing was performed at 254:02:37:55 G.m.t. (01:04:15:00 MET)
using thrusters L3A and R3A. The firing duration was approximately two seconds and
the resultant _V was 0.2 ft/seC.
The Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment (SPIFEX) payload was grappled and
unberthed at 253.20:41:32 G.m.t. (00:22:51:37 MET), and the SPIFEX planned data
takes were completed. The SPIFEX Operations and the remote manipulator system
(RMS) Operations were nominal.
During the second day of RMS/SPIFEX operations, all RMS operations were nominal.
One wrist pitch brake slip message occurred during one of the primary RCS firings;
however, this was an expected phenomenon.
The flash evap0ratOr system (FES) supply water system A accumulator temperature
began cycling between 48 °F and 55 °F at approximately 253:02;00 G.m.t: _
(00:03_38 MET). The normal control range for the thermostat is between 55 °F and
4
75 °F. A comparison with the B supply accumulator temperature indicated that the
temperature sensor was partially or totally debonded. The temperature cycles indicate
that the heater was operating properly. There was no impact for this condition as the
temperature never approached 32 °F. A heater reconfiguration was performed at
257:12;52 G.m.t. (04:14:30 MET), and data from the B heaters support the theory that
the temperature sensor was partially or totally debonded. A postflight inspection is
required to verify the sensor condition.
The launch/entry suit (LES) thermoelectric (TE) cooling unit data logger displayed a
spurious flashing signature on its liquid crystal display (LCD) during deactivation on-
orbit. During the deactivation, two resets were performed and the recorder was
powered down in accordance with the instructions located on the data logger. The data
logger is a secondary objective of DTO 674 and was used to gather performance data
from the cooling system. The spurious flashing signature most probably resulted from
completely depressing only one of two membrane-type buttons that should have been
pressed simultaneously for proper operation of the logger.
The fourth RCS trim firing was performed at 254:15:25:37.95 G.rn.t. (0,1:17:02:42 MET)
using thrusters L3A and R3A. The firing consisted of seven +X pulses over a
25-second period and resulted in a AV of 1.5 ft/sec. Vernier RCS th_'u_ters F5R, F5L,
and R5R were also fired for three pulses each during this m_neuve_.
At 254:11:55:42 G.m.t. (01:13:32:47 MET), the MCA 1 operational stat_ bit 4
transitioned from a 1 to a 0. At 254:15:03:37 G.m.t. (01:17:41:42 MET), the status bit
transitioned back to a 1. No drive currents were detected on the supplying ac bus, nor
were any position changes noted in the controller motorS. Also, no change in the aft
power controller 4 voltage or current measurements occurred during the transition
times. The measurement (V76X2254E) is downlinked at one sample per second
through multiplexer/demultiplexer (MDM) OA1, Card 7, channel 00, and no other
measurements on that channel changed states during the period in question. Had the
indication remained, at least one additional failure would have been required before a
function would have been lost or any corrective action required.
The left and right aft RCS were interConnected to the OMS at 255:03:08 G.rn.t.
(02:05:46 MET). The systems operated nominally. The interconnect operations were
stopped at 260:15:31 G.m.t. (07:17:08 MET) with 10.76 percent Of propellants from the
left OMS and 9.47 percent of propellant from the right OMS used by the RCS.
_ At approximately 255:18:00 G.m.t. (02:19:38 MET), the COmmander tep0rted a i_robiem
, when filling some of the drink bags. The problem drink bags have a restricted septum
_i caused by excessive heat application dunng manufacture Approximately 10 percent of
II the total Of 746 drink bags stowed were suspected of having this problem. This
restriction resulted in a smaller-than-normal quantity of water entering the bag, The
I Crew was briefed on methods Of dealing with th_s problem prior t0 the flight.
RCS trim firing 5 was performed at 256:15:14:24 G.m.t. (03:17:41:29 MET) with a
duration of approximately 6 seconds. Thrusters L3A and R3A were used to provide a
AV of 2.l ft/sec. RCS trim firing 6 was performed at 256:16:00:34 G.m.t.
(03:18:3;':39 MET) with a duration of approximately 5 seconds. Thrusters L3A and
R3A were used to provide a AV of 1.3 ft/sec. Subsystem operation during both firings
was nominal.
Three major RCS separation maneuvers were performed after the SPARTAN
deployment. RCS operation for the first two maneuvem was nominal. Thruster F4D
had a low P_ indication of 70 psia at 256:16:01:22 G.m.t. (03:18:29:27 MET). Sixteen
instances of the chamber pressure (Pc) being lower than the normal 150 psia on RCS
thruster F4D were noted during the flight. Low Pc has occurred on the last five flights of
F4D, with 3 instances on STS-60 and 11 instances on STS-51. In each case, the next
firing of the thruster after a low Pc indication has been at the normal 150-psia level.
This low Pc posed no problem for the flight.
A supply water dump was initiated at 256:12:35 G.m.t. (03:14:12 MET) and was
terminated after 1 hour 15 minutes with 195.2 Ib of supply water dumped. The dump
was nominal; however, about 50 minutes after dump termination, the supply dump line
temperature experienced an abrupt 8 °F temperature rise, which is indicative of a
"burp." Review of the data for the first three supply dumps indicated that the line was
not completaly purged on the third dump. An extended post-dump purge for the
duration of the nozzle bakeout (250 °F) was performed for the remaining supply dumps.
The Ku-band radcr failed to lock on the SPARTAN payload following deployment at
256:21:29:57 G.m.t. (03:23:07:02 MET). The Ku-band passed several self-tests during
the first hour after deployment with nominal results. Multiple searches were performed
in both the general purpose computer (GPC) and automatic (Auto) modes with the
output power in high and low and the range get in minimum and automatic, all without
success. Approximately one hour after SPARTAN deployment, the Ku-band acquired
the target, and remained locked on until the communications mode was selected. The
Ku-band radar acquired the SPARTAN at 128,000 ft during retrieval activities, with lock
remaining until 81 ft. All Ku-band operations during rendezvous were nominal.
During SPARTAN deployment operations, the berthing camera failed to Operate.
An¢lysis has shown that the label on the A7 panel that activated the SPARTAN
berthing camera was placed over the wrong pUsh-button. The PL3 button, which was
labeled as a video tape recorder, wag the correct button. The camera wOrked properly
when the correct button was depressed.
During SPARTAN deployment Operations, the Tr_.jectory Control Sensor (TCS)
(DTO 700-5), had problems acqUiring ,_PARTAN as a target. The problem Was traced
to a Y-oable between the TCS and the payload and general support computer (PGSC).
A plan wag developed and uplinked tO the Crew to trade the connectors on the "Y"
cable. This was done and the TCS was operational for SPARTAN retrieval.
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On flight day 5, the consumables margin reached a level that was sufficient to support
flight operations for 10 plus 2 days. As a result, the Mission Management Team
authorized an extension day, which was inserted into the flight plan following the day
during which the extravehicular activity (EVA) was performed.
At 258:22:51 G.m.t. (06:00"29 MET), the right OMS was used to perform the first of tWo
orbit-adjust maneuvers. The first firing was 17.52 seconds in duration and the resultant
AV was 15 ft/sec. The left OMS was used for the second firing, which was initiated at
258:23:36 G.m.t. (06:01:14 MET). The firing duration was 17.64 seconds and ti_e
resultant AV was 15 ft/sec. This maneuver placed the Orbiter in a 130 nmi. circular
orbit.
The proximity operations (PROX OPS) camera did not come oi, when power was
applied on flight day 6. The condition was caused by camera automatic light control
(ALC) logic lock up. The crew performed malfunction procedure 2.4b to recover the
camera. A power cycle was performed during this procedure and normal camera
operations were restored.
On flight day 8, the crewmembers donned their extravehicular mobility units (EMUs)
:-_and performed a 50-minute in-suit prebreathe. The prebreathe period had been
lengthened as the crew cabin had been at 10.2 psia slightly less than 24 hours. At the
end of the prebreathe period, the airlock was depressurized to vacuum and the EVA
began at 259:14:42:00 G.m.t. (06:16:20:55 MET). Dudng the very successful EVA,
seven nitrogen recharges of the simplified aid for EVA rescue (SAFER) unit were
performed. The SAFER unit performed in an excellent manner throughout the EVA
evaluation. The RMS was used extensively during the SAFER evaluation, and all
systems performed nominally. After completion of the planned SAFER EVA activities,
the crew members ingressed the airloCk. The EMUs were oohnected to Orbiter power
at 259:21:31:21 G.m.t. (06:23:08:26 MET). The total official EVA time of 6 hours
51 minutes.
Three EVA equipment anomalies were noted during the EVA. The articulating portable
foot restraint (APFR) thermal cover interfered with the full insertion of the APFR
simulator into the SPARTAN mission peculiar experiment support structure (MPESS)
portable foot restraint (PFR) socket during the APFR Ioad-limiter evaluation. The
thermal cover was peeled back and the APFR simulator fitted properly. Aise, .fw_
electronic cuff checklist (ECC) anomalies were noted during the EVA. The ECC-1 did
not always respond when the upper middle sextant was depressed. SeCOndly, during
an attempt t0 update the contents Of ECC=2, _. "WRITE ROM ERROR '_message was
displayed 0r_the PGSC by the update application. The ECC=2 was still usable for the
EVA as the crew proceeded with the update despite the error message.
On September 12, during a deorbit preparations traihing session on the Shuttle Missi0r_
SimUlator (SMS), a backup flight system (BFS) display interface 10ss Condition was
discovered after th,. BFS was moded to halt following an initial program load (IPL).
When the BFS was later taken from halt to standby and assigned a cathode ray tube
(CRT), the crew noted a big "X" without a "POLL FAIU' on the BFS CRT. During the
slmulation, the crew attempted to assign the BFS to other CRTs, but the big X was
displayed on all CRTs to which an assignment was attempted. Analysis of the GPC
clump collected following the anomaly showed that the BFS was halted while the
module multifunctlon CRT display subsystem (MCDS) Update Module (MUM) was
either active or suspended. The signature of this condition is clearly recognizable, the
probability of occurrence was low, and the BFS can be recovered with a re-IPL
procedure.
Analysis of the BFS software further revealed an additional scenario in which a big X
with no POLL FAIL can occur on a BFS display. This scenario involves a transition
back to OPS 0 where the MUM gets suspended prior to the initiation of the operations
(OPS) transition. The transition back to OPS 0 makes the incompleted task MUM
inactive and thus the flag MUM DONE is not properly set to continue display updating.
This is the same type of problem described in the previous paragraph, but the window
¢,fexposure is considerably smaller. The corrective actions for both problems were
identical.
Seven RCS maneuvers were performed during the SPARTAN rendezvous. _ese
were the NO3 firing of 2.4 ft/sec; the NC4 firing of 2.2 ft/sec; the NCC mar,...=ver of
1.1 ft/sec; the TI firing of 3.1 ft/sec; and three MC firings of 2.2, 0.59, and 0.74 ft/sec,
respectively. The RCS performed satisfactorily during these maneuvers.
The TCS (DTO 700-5) operated flawlessly from 400 ft through SPARTAN retrieval.
Likewise, the berthing and proximity operations cameras operated nominally.
The RMS operated satisfactorily during the retrieval and berthing of the SPARTAN
payload. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining the ready-to-latch indicators on
the V-guides for the payload. The payload also had to be backed out of the guides for
a primary RCS firing, during which the RMS brakes were applied. The berthing
operation was then completed and the RMS was cradled and placed in the temperature
monitoring mode.
The RMS elbow camera exhibited periodic horizontal jitter beginning at
259:15:12 G.m.t. (06:17:50 MET). At 259:16:34 G.m.t. (06:18:12 MET), the camera
temperature had increased 5 °F and the camera was operating properly.
At 259:21':56 G.m.t. (06:23:34 MET), a "CRT BITE 1" message was annunciated
indicating that the built in test equipment (BITE) had detected a problem. The BITE
was attributed to a previously defined COndition (User Note 55331) in which two key
strokes are made in rapid succession.
The RMS was powered up at 260:13:12 G.m,t. (07:14:50 MET). It was unCradled,
grappled the SPIFEX at 260:13:24 G.m.t. (07_15:02 MET), and maneuvered to the
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SPIFEX extended park position. The RMS completed all SPIFEX operations nominally
at 260:20:01 G.m.t. (07:21:39 MET). The RMS was cradled and the manipulator
---positioning mechanisms (MPMs) were stowed. No further RMS operations were
planned or performed during STS-64.
The RCS hot-fire was performed at 261:14:53:56 G.m.t. (08:16:31:01 MET). At
261:14:56:05 G.m.t. (08:16:33:10 MET) during the hot-fire, RCS thruster L1A was
deselected by the redundancy management (RM) software because of low _hamber
pressure (16 psia). This was the first firing of the L1A thruster during the mission. The
oxidizer valve began leaking immediately after the failure, and the leak detector
temperature continued to cycle after the firing attempt. No fuel leakage was detected.
The most probable cause of the failure is nitrate contamination in the pilot and/or
mainstage of the oxidizer valve, which resulted in a failure of the valve to fully open,
thus creating a leak path. Thruster L1A remained deseleoted for the remainder of the
mission. The remaining thrusters operated satisfactorily during the hot-fire.
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed satisfactorily at
----_261:13:29:07.48 G.m.t. (08:15:06:11.54 MET) and APU 3 ran for 6 minutes
35.61 seconds. The APU operated nominally with 20 Ib of fuel used during the
checkout. Hydraulic system 3, used for the FCS checkout, performed nominally. No
water spray boiler (WSB) spray cooling was observed because of the short run-time of
the APU.
There were two instances when the Orbiter return link was lost while the forward link
remained operational. The first loss occurred when acquiring the TDRS West, and the
second occurred several orbits later four minutes after an early handover to the TDRS
East. The losses were caused by a software problem at the second TDRS ground
terminal when the hourly vector was initiated too close to the service-start time, and
time was not available for proper processing of the vector. A workaround was
established to prevent an hourly vector from being accepted within 10 minutes of
service-start time. Following this change, no additional occurrences of the anomaly
were noted.
During deorbit preparations, when the FES checkout was performed at
262:14:24 G.m.t. (09:16:02 MET), the secondary high-load evaporator exhibited
temperature oscillations before the temperature settted within the ContrOl band of
62:1:2 °F. The secondary topping evaporator showed no oscillations when it was
started. The primary B controller also showed some temperature OsCillations before it
reached its control band of 39:1:1 OF. The first temperature oscillations were most
likely caused by a slow response of the midpoint temperature sensor which controls the
secondary high load evapOrator. The second set of temperature oscillations was most
likely caused by the midpoint temperature sensor, which controls the high-load
evaporator using the primary B ContrOller. NO in-flight check0ut requirements were
violated as a result of these oscillations.
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All deorbit preparations for the first and second Kennedy Space Center' (KSC) landing
opportunities on the first planned landing day (September 19) were completed, and the
payload bay doors were clOsed at 262:14:50:32 G.m.t. (09:16:27:37 MET). Weather
for both landing opportunities at KSC remained unacceptable, because thunderstorms
were within 30 miles and lightning was being Observed. As a result, landing was
delayed until the first contingency day.
During the execution of procedures to back out of the deorbit configuration, the BFS
was moded from halt to standby, and an "X" appeared on the CRT display. The crew
performed a BFS IPL and restored normal BFS Operation.
All deorbit preparations were again completed for the KSC and Edwards Air Force
Base (EAFB) landing opportunities on the first contingency day (September 20) and the
payload bay doors were closed at 263:14:41:35 G.m.t. (10:16:18:40 MET). Both
landing opportunities at KSC were waived because of unacceptable weather conditions
at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), and the decision was made to land at Edwards Air
Force Base concrete runway 04. The deorbit maneuver was initiated at
263:20:17:00.5 G.m.t. (10:21:55:05.5 MET), and was 181.3 seconds in duration with a
AV of 323.6 ft/sec.
During landing just prior to tactical air navigation (TACAN) data being incorporated into
the navigation, TACAN 1 experienced spurious 40-degree bearing movements, which
was an expected condition for this TACAN. When TACAN data were selected, TACAN
1 bearing data exceeded RM-allowed dispersions, and TACAN 1 was deselected by
the RM. Immediately after TACAN 1 bearing data were deselected, TACAN 1 bea_ing
data recovered and were nominal for the remainder of the mission.
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at Edwards Air FOrce Base on cOnCrete
runway 04 at 263:21:12:52 G.m.t. (10:22'.49:57 MET) on September 20, 1994. The
Orbiter drag chute was deployed satisfactorily at 263:21:12:58.6 G.m.t., and nose
landing gear touchdown occurred 4 seconds after drag chute deployment. The drag
chute was jettisoned at 263:21:13:31.1 G.m.t. with wheels,stop occurring at
263:21:13:54 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The flight duration was
10 days, 22 hours, 49 minutes, and 57 seconds.
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PAYLOADS
The payloads flown on the STS-64 mission consisted of the following:
a. Lidar In-Space Technology Experiment;
b. _huttle Pointed Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy -210;
c. Robot Operated Materials Processing System;
d. Get-Away Specials (10);
e. Air Force Maui Optical Site;
f. Military Application of Ship Tracks;
g. Solid Surface Combustion Experiment;
h. Radiation Monitor Experiment - III;
I. Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II; and
j. Biological Research in Canisters.
In addition to these 10 payloads, located in the payload bay and the middeck areas,
hardware for three DTO experiments was also located in the payload bay. These were:
a. Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment (DTO 830);
b. Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (DTO 661); and
c. Trajectory Control Sensor (DTO 700-5).
LIDAR IN-SPACE TECHNOLOGY EXPERIMENT
The STS-64 mission was the first flight of the LIDAR In-Space Technology Experiment
(LITE) payload, which was developed by the Langley Research Center and flown as a
technology test. The LITE provided an opportunity to collect valuable information about
the Earth's atmosphere. Over the planned 9-day mission, the LITE was to collect
atmospheric data during ten 4 1/2-hour sessions for a total of 45 hours of data.
The LITE instrument provided outstanding data during its 53 hours of operation, more
than 8 hours longer than the premission plans. The extra hours became available with
the addition of the energy-dependent extension day, as well as ground command
operations during the crew stow-time period and the delay in stowing the Ku-band
antenna on entry day. The scientists acquired more than 43.5 hours of high-rate data
during operations, Obtaining unprecedented views of cloud structures, stOrm systems,
dust clouds, pollutants, forest burning and surface reflectance. Data images clearly
indicated high cloud cover and dust ston'ns over West Africa and dramatically oullined
the structure of the super typhoon Melissa, including unprecedented details of the eye
of the storm. Sixty-five teams from 20 countries performed validation measurements
with ground,based and aircraft instruments around the Earth tO verify LIi"E's data.
Several laser shutdowns occurred due to coolant loop problems that may have been
the resUlt Ofcohtamination. Adjustments were made tO the monit0red-senS0r limits to
enable proceeding with operations. The degradation of both lasers' Output energy
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required swapping betWeenthe tWo lasers. Laser A was operated until
258:01:22:55 G.m.t. (05:03:00 MET) and again for the last three data takes.
Onboard recording of the high-rate data was corrupted. Replacement of the transport
unit (TU) of the high data rate recorder (HDRR), inspection of the cable connections
and power cycling the digital data handling unit (DDHU) were unsuccessful in
correcting the problem. Further troubleshooting was accomplished after the flight.
The LITE system performed more effectively than originally expectedj demonstrating
the ability of a LIDAR system to penetrate multiple clouds and aerosol layers down to
the Earth's surface. Operations of the instrument in the autonomous mode, accurate
boresight of the laser beam, and command of the instrument in both real time and time-
executable modes have all been demonstrated.
SHUTTLE POINTED AUTONOMOUS RESEARCH TOOL FOR ASTRONOMY
The Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy (SPARTAN) -201
studied the acceleration and velocity of the solar wind and measured aspects of the
Sun's corona in an effort to explain how the solar wind is generated by the Sun. The
solar wind originates in the corona, the outermost atmosphere of the Sun. SPARTAN-
201 carried two separate telescopes to study the corona. One telescope, the White
Light Coronagraph (WLC), measured the density distribution of electrons making up
the corona. The second telescope, the Ultraviolet Coronal Spectrometer (UVCS),
investigated the temperatures and distributions of protons and hydrogen atoms through
the same layers of the corona.
The SPARTAN-201 was deployed using the RMS _.t 256:21:30 G.m.t. (03:23:07 MET).
The release was extremely stable_ with no discernible tip-off rates generated by the
RMS. FollOwing deployment, the pirouette maneuver was executed as planned,
indicating a healthy attitude,control system. The SPARTAN-201 operated
autonomously for approximately 47 hours, gathering data in accordance with its
preflight planned program. The Orbiter rendezvoused with the SPARTAN,201 at
258:20:56 G.m,t, (05:22:33 MET)_ and the SPARTAN-201 was berthed in the payload
bay at 258:22:28 G,m.t. (06:00:05 MET). The berthing process required three attempts
to obtain all three ready-to-latch indications before the payload was latched.
ROBOT OPERATED MATERIALS PROCESSING SYSTEM
The Robot Operated Materials Processing System (ROMPS) used the microgravity
environment to develop commercially valuable methods of processing semiConductOr
materials. Using the first United States robotics system in space, the ROMPS
demonstrated that the use of rObetics in space is viable and can reduce the costs of
developing and manufacturing semiconductors. All primary mission objectives were
accomplished.
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The ROMPS flight hardware was contained in a pair of Getaway Special (GAS)
canisters that were payload bay sidewall-mounted on a Hitchhiker carrier. One canister
contained the samples, sample storage racks, the robot, two furnaces, and some
electronics. The second canister contained the control electronics and Hitchhiker
interface for power as well as ground links for telemetry and commands.
The ROMPS was activated shortly after launch at 253:00:38 G.m.t. (00:02:15 MET) .lnd
initially deactivated at 262:12:30 G.m.t. (09:14:08 MET) for the first landing attempt.
After the wave-off of the first landing attempt, the ROMPS was reactivated and finally
powered off at 263:13:14 G.m.t. (10:14:59 MET) for landing.
ROMPS successfully completed processing all 100 experimental samples including 32
critical samples processed without thruster firings. Engineering tests of the robot
systems and the capacfflector were also accomplished. Operations were nominal
except for the intermittent end-of-travel limit tripping on the robot radial axis. The last
22 samples were processed with an uplinked change to the radial arm calibration
program that provided a workaround for the problem.
GET-AWAY SPECIALS
The GAS Program continues to provide a means whereby individuals and organizations
may conduct experiments in space. A total of 117 GAS payloads have been flown
since the beginning of the Space Shuttle Program. The 10 GAS payloads flown on
STS-64 include !9 individual experiments as follows:
a. G-178 - Ozone Measurements of Earth's Upper Atmosphere in the Ultraviolet
(UV) 200 to 400 Nanometer Spectral Range. This experiment is sponsored by Sierra
College.
b. G-254 - Four experiments were flown in the G-254 GAS and they were
sponsored by the Kinkaid School and Utah State University. The four experiments plus
the power source were: --
1. Spacepak 1 - Distillation Experiment;
2. Spacepak 2 - Float Zone Instability Experiment;
3. Spacepak 4- Pachamama; and
4. Spacepak 5 - Bubble Intefferometer Experiment.
5. Spacepak 3 - Power source for all four experiments;
c. G-325 - Sound Effects on Dust Particles in Near Zero Gravity. This
experiment was sponsored by the Norfolk Public Schools of No"folk, VA.
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d. G-417 -Three experiments were flown in the G-417 GAS container, and they
were sponsored by the Beijing Institute of Environmental Testing in Beijing, China. The
three experiments were:
1. Reproduction of Parameciums;
2. Surface Interaction of Different Fluids; and
3_ _Survey of Surface Interaction of Solids and Liquids.
e. G-453 - Two experiments were flown in the G453 GAS container, and they
were sponsored by the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Inc. These
experiments were:
1. Formation of Silicon-Lead (Si-Pb) Alloy; and
2. Boiling of Organic Solvent (Freon 113) under MiCrogravity and in the
Absence of Convection.
f. G-454 - Two experiments were flown in the G=454 GAS container, and they
were sponsored by the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Inc. The two
experiments were:
1. Crystal Growth of 3-Selenic-Niobium (NbSe3) from the Vapor Phase.
2. Crystal Growth of the Optoelectronic Crystal by the Diffusion Method.
g. G-456 - Electrophoresis Experiment. This experiment was sponsored by the
Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Inc.
h. G-485 - Feasibility of Depositing Different Materials in a Vacuum
Environment in Microgravity. This experiment was sponsored by the European Space
Agency/ESTEC FTD, The Netherlands.
• i. G-506 - Orbiter Stability Experiment. This experiment was sponsored by the
Goddard Space Flight Center.
j. G-562 - QUEST-2 Materials Science Experiment. The three experiments
were sponsored by the Canadian Space Agency and consisted of the following:
.
2.
3.
One Gravity.
Droplet Growth in Liquid-Liquid Systems.
Metal-matrix composites for applications demanding high performance.
Distribution of Reinforcing Material Produced in Microgravity and in
AIR FORCE MAUl OPTICAL SITE
The AMOS is an electrical-optical facility on the Hawaiian island of Maul. No hardware
is required onboard the Orbiter to support the experimental obserVations of thruster
firings, Water dumps, etc. The one opportunity planned for this flight on orbit 58 was
canceled due to the elevation angle between the Orbiter and Maul being too low for the
sensor t0 acquire and track the Orbiter.
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MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF SHIP TRACKS
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored the MAST experiment on STS-64.
MAST is a part of a five-year research program developed to examine the effects of
ships on surrounding clouds and aerosols. The experiment was flown under the
direction of the Department of Defense (DOD) Space Test Program. Nineteen target
opportunities were uplinked to the crew during flight days 3, 4, 7, 9, and 10. The
success of this experiment will be determined by posfflight analysis.
SOLID SURFACE COMBUSTION EXPERIMENT
The SSCE was flown for the seventh time during the STS.64 mission. This experiment
is used to study how flames spread in a microgravity environment. Conducting the
flame spreading experiment in miorogravity removes buoyant air motion, commonly
observed as "hot gases rising", caused by gravity. A comparison made of the
microgravity results with the normal-gravity-0f-Earth results has provided detailed
information about air motion and its effects on flame spreading. Between
255:23:48 G.m.t. (03:01:25 MET) and 256:00:22 G.m.t. (03:01:59 MET), two SSCE
burns were completed. Nominal operations were reported; however, further
conclusions await completion of the posfflight analysis.
RADIATION MONITORING EXPERIMENT
The RME -III measured the crew exposure to ionizing radiation withi._ the Orbiter cabin.
The RME-ill measured gamma ray, electron, neutron and proton radiation, and
calculated the real-time exposure in PADS-tissue equivalent. The RME-III was set-up
and stowed in accordance with the flight plan. The first two changes of the memory
module occurred near the end of the life expectancy of the batteries, resulting in
messages and incorrect times on the modules. The remaining memory module
replacements were perfOrmed earlier to prevent similar events from recurring, The data
were stored and will be analyzed posfflight.
SHUTI'LE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT
The SAREX is a joint project of NASA, the American Radio Relay League, and the
Radio Amateur Satellite Corporation. This was the fifteenth flight of the SAREX, and
the project encourages public participation in the SpaCe Program and supports
educational initiatives. All 10 school contacts were completed successfully, and the
Schools contacted were:
a. Grizzly Hill School, North San Juan, California;
b. BranSon School, F_Oss,California;
c. Crystal Lake South Elementary, Crystal Lake, Illinois;
¢1. MOrocco Elementary SchOolj Morocco, Indiana;
e. Dwight D. Eisenh0wer Middle Sch0ol_ LaUrel, Maryland;
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f. Springfield Plains Elementary, Clarkston, Michigan;
g. Francis Howell North High School, St. Charles, Missouri;
h. Central Square Middle School, Central Square, New York;
i STEP/Star Schools - Young Astronauts, Spokane, Washington; and
j Middleton Grange School, Christchurch, New Zealand.
In addition, the crew made some random voice contacts, and once the power limitations
were removed on flight day 9, robot packet contacts were also recorded as well as
short conversations with personnel including Astronaut Bonnie Dunbar at Star City,
Russia.
BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN CANISTERS
The Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC) -2 experiment was the facility for basic
reseamh on the development and differentiation of Orchard Grass, which is from a
major food crop familythat provides half of the world's caloric intake from plants.
Orchard grass is part of the plant family that includes wheat, rice, and corn.
The BRIC-2 experiment was installed within 24 hours of the opening of the launch
window and was removed within three hours of landing. The experiment did not require
power or' crew interac,_tion. Postflight analysis is required to determine the success of
this experiment.
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V_HICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
AllSRB systems performed nominally. The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal with
no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document (OMRSD) violations.
Power-up arid operation of all igniter and field joint heaters was accomplished routinely.
For this flightj the low-pressure heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was used to
maintain the case/nozzle joint temperatures within the required LCC ranges.
At T-15 minutes, the purge was changed to high pressure to inert the SRB aft skirt.
Both SRB's were successfully separated from the ET at approximately
T+122.6 seconds, and recovery area reports indicate that the deceleration system
performed as designed. Both SRB's were observed during descent, and found floating
near the retrieval ships.
Duringthe posfflight disassembly, a foreign material was found in connector
X13W12RP1 of the right-hand aft integrated electronics cable assembly (Flight
Problem STS-64-B-01). Analysis of the foreign material is continuing.
Also during the posfflight disassembly, debris was found in connectors J4 and J21 of
the right-hand forward integrated electronics assembly (Flight Problem STS-64-B-02).
Analysis of the debris is continuing.
REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
All RSRM systems performed nominally and no LCC or OMRSD violations were noted.
All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits throughout the
countdown.
As a result of the very warm atmospheric temperatures present on the day of launch,
field joint heaters operated for 13 hours 12 minutes, and this equates to power being
applied i4 percent Of the time during the LCC time-frame. LikewiSe, the igniter joint
heaters operated for only 19 hours 31 minutes, and this equates to 25 percent of the
time during the LCC time-frame. Also, because of the atmospheric temperatures
present, aft skirt thermal Conditioning Was not necessary.
Data ir_dicate that the flight performance Of both RSRM's, as shown in the fOllowing
table, was well within the alloWable perfOrmance envelopes, and was typical of the
I_erformance observed on previous flights. The RSRM propellant mean bulk
temperatUre (PMB_ was 82 OF. The table on the following page presents the
performance data for the RSRMs.
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse gates
1-20,10e Ibf-sec
1-60, 10e Ibf-sec
FAT, 106 Ibf-sec
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-sec/Ibm
Bum rate, in/sec @ 60 °F
at 625 psia
Bum rate, in/sec @ 81 °F
at 625, psia
Event times, seconds `=
IgnitiOn interval
Web time b
Separation cue, 50 psia
Action time b
Separation command
PMBT, °F
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psia/10 ms
Decay time, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K).
Left motor, 82 °F Right motor, 82 °F
.. Predicted) Actual Predicted I Actual
65.98
175.72
296.85
66.78
176.87
297.13.
66.21
176.23
296.85
66.68
176.81
296.64
268,6 268.9 268.6 268.4
0.3669 0.36811
0.3739
N/A
109.0
117.4
119.8
122.5
0.3727
0.3677
0.3735
0.232
108.8
118.5
120.5
123.8
0.232 i
109.2
118.9
120.9
123.8
0.3684
"0.3742
N/A
108.6
117.5
119.7
122.5
82 82 82 82
90.4 N/A
2.8
90.4
2.8
N/A
Tailoff Imbalance impulse Predicted Actual
differential, Klbf-sec N/A 208.4
Impulse Imbalance = left motor minus right motor
=All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a 2.
b Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval).
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EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with the ET propellant loading and flight
operations were met. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated
satisfactorily. El" purge and heater operations were monitored and all performed
properly. No ET LCC or OMRSD violations were identified, nor were any in-flight
anomalies identified.
Typical ice/froSt formations were observed on the ET during the countdown. There was
no Observed ice or frost on the acreage areas of the ET. NOrmal quantities of ice or
frost were present on the liquid oxygen (LOz) and liquid hydrogen (LH=) feedlines arid
on the pressurization line brackets, and some frost or ice was present along the LH=
pr0tuberahce air load (PAL) ramps. Thuse obserVati0hs indicated acceptable
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conditions based on NSTS 08303. The Ice/Frost inspection team reported that no
anomalous TPS conditions were noted.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and the
flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure slump
was 13.g psid.
A number of exposures were made; however, only one usable post-separation ET
photograph was taken by the crew using a 35 mm camera with a 300 mm lens and a
2X multiplier. Lighting conditions that were present with the late afternoon launch
prevented obtaining more than one image. This one photograph showed 12 divots
approximately 6 inches in diameter in the +Y/-Z quadrant of the intertank-to-LH2 flange
closeout. These divots are typical of those observed on previous missions.
ET separation was confirmed. ET entry and breakup were within the predicted
footprint, 98 nmi. uprange of the preflight predicted impact point.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
All SSME parameters appeared normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and were
typical of prelaunoh parameters observed on previous flights, Engine ready was
achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine start and thrust buildup were
normal.
Flight data indicate that SSME performance during mainstage, throttling, shutdown, and
propellant dump operations was normal. High pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP)
and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures appeared to be well within
specification throughout engine operation. MECO occurred 514.6 seconds after liftoff,
and no failures or problems were noted during the ascent phase. The Isp was rated as
452.5 seconds based on trajectory data.
The SSME 1 high pressure oxidizer turbine (HPOT) intermediate seal pressure shifted
upward at engine start minus 5500 seconds. This shift is within the experience base
and was possibly due to nose-seal leakage. A simflar shift was Observed during the
green run of this pump.
Also, SSME 1 HPFTP coolant liner pressure exhibited minor random shifts during
mainstage operation. The shifts were within the experience bas_ and poSSibly due to
leakage past the static s,qals.
The SSME 2 and 3 HPOTP rotors slowed down at engine Cutoff plus 2,5 SecoNds. This
phenomenon has been Observed five times in the past, and this was the second time it
has OCcurred on the SSME 2 HPOTP. It is believed to be caused by interstage seal
rubbing.
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SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown, and the SRSS performed as designed
throughout the ascent phase.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the MPS was as expected. LO2 and LH2 loading were
performed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts. Also, no L.CC or OMRSD
violations were ide,"_,,ifi.ad.
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in the
Orbiter aft compartment (occurred shortly after the start of fast fill) was approximately
130 ppm, and this compares favorably with previous data from this vehicle.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish with the
Dinventory (planned) load results in a loading accuracy of +0.01 percent for LH2 and
+0.03 percent for the LO2.
The LH2 and LO2 pressurization and feed systems performed nominally and satisfied all
tank-ullage pressure and SSME inlet net positive suction pressure (NPSP)
requirements. Analyses of the propulsion systems during start, mainstage and
shutdown operations indicated that performance was nominal and all requirements
were Satisfied.
The LH_ and LOg propellant dump operations were initiated at MECO + 120.4 seconds
as planned. Posfflight analyses indicated that the performance was nominal.
The vacuum inerting process was initiated by the OI-23 software. A predicted pressure
rise of approximately 30 psi in the hydrogen manifold was exceeded by approximately
3 psi, and this was similar to the previous flight of OI-23 software on STS-65, although
the pressure rise was greater on this flight. Because of this excessive pressure rise,
the crew manually performed a second vacuum,inerting procedu_'e.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The performance of the RCS was nominal with two in-flight anomalies identified. RCS
propellant C0nsurnption was 5,111.1 Ibm. The left and right aft RCS were
interconnected to the OMS at 255:03:08 G.m.t. (02:05:46 MET). The systems Operated
nominally. The ir_terc0nnect Operations were stopped at 260:15:31 G.m,t.
2O
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(07:17:08 MET) with 10.76 percent of propellants from the left OMS attd 9.47 percent of
propellant from the right OMS (2,615.9 Ibm total) used by the RCS.
Six RCS trim firings were performed with nominal subsystem operatiott. The first RCS
trim firing was initiated at 253:02:45:25 G.m.t. (00:04:22:31 MET) using multiple
thrusters. The firing was 5 seconds in duration with a AV of 1.4 ft/sec. The second
firing was initiated at 253:03:33:09 G.m.t. (00:05:10:15 MET) using multiple thrusters.
The +Z maneuver was approximately 10 seconds in duration with a Z_Vof 3.7 ft/sec.
The third RCS trim firing was performed at 254:02:37:55 G.m.t. (01:04:15:00 MET)
using thrusters L3A and R3A. The firing duration was approximately two seconds and
the resultant &V was 0.2 ft/sec. The fourth RCS trim firing was performed at
254:15:25:37.95 G.m.t. (01:17:02:42 MET) using thrusters L3A and R3A. The firing
consisted of seven +X pulses over a 251second period and resulted in a _V of
1.5 ft/sec. Vernier RCS thrusters F5R, F5L, and R5R were also fired fo; three •pulses
each during this maneuver, RCS trim firing 5 was performed at 256:15:14:24 G.m.t.
(03:17:41:29 MET) with a duration of approximately 6 seconds. Thrusters L3A and
R3A were used to provide a AV of 2,1 ft/sec. RCS trim firing 6 was performed at
256:16:00:34 G.m.t. (03:18:37:39 MET) with a duration of approximately 5 seconds.
Thrusters L3A and R3A were used to provide a AV of 1.3 ft/sec.
Three major RCS separation maneuvers were performed after the SPARTAN
deployment. RCS operation for the first two maneuvers was nominal. During the third
maneuver, thruster F4D had a low Pc indication of 70 psia at 256:16:01:22 G.m.t.
(03:18:29:27 MET). Sixteen instances of the chamber pressure (Pc) being lower than
the normal 150 psia on RCS thruster F4D were noted during the flight (Flight Problem
STS-64-V-09). Low P_ has occurred on the last five flights of F4D, with three instances
on STS-60 and 11 instances on STS-51. In each case, the next firing of the thruster
after a low Pc indication has been at the normal 150-psia level. This low Pc posed no
problem for the flight.
The RCS hot-fire was performed at 261:14:53:56 G.m.t. (08:16:31:01 MET). At
261:14:56:05 G.m.t. (08:16:33:10 MET) during the hot-fire, RCS thruster LIA was
deselected by the RM software because of low Chamber pressure (16 psia) (Flight
Problem STS-64-V-03). This was the first firing of the L1A thruster during the mi._ion.
The oxidizer valve began leaking immediately after the failure, and the leak detector
temperature continued to cycle after the firing attempt, No fuel leakage was detected.
The most probable cause of the failure was nitrate contamination in the pilot and/or
mainstage of the oxidizer valVe, which resulted in a failure of the valve to fully open,
thus creating a leak path. Thruster L1A remained deselected for the remainder of the
mission. The remaining thrusters operated s$.tisfa_tofily during the hot-fire.
OrbitsI Manauvefinq Subsystem
The OMS performed satisfactOrily during tho four maneuvers executed during the flight
as are shown ir_the table on the fOllowing page. The total firing time for the left and
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right OMS engines was 324,2 and 324.1 seconds, respectively, and the total
propellants used during the OMS maneuvers was 15,017 Ibm.
OMS firing
OMS-2
OMS-3
OMS-4
Engine
Both_
Right
Left
Deorbit Both
OMS FIRINGS
Time, G.m.t./MET
252:22:59:'03:8 G.m.t.
00:00:36:03,.8 MET
258:22:51:47.2 G.m.t.
06:00_28:52.2 MET
258:23:36:46.4 G.m,t.
06:01:13:41.4 MET
Firing
duration,
seconds
125.4
17.4
17.5
AV,
ft/sec
208.7
15.0
15.0
263:20:17:00.5 G.m.t. 181.3 323.6
10:21:55:05.5 MET
Five periods of RCS interconnect operations, for a total time of 4 days 0 hours
3 seconds, were completed during the mission. During the interconnect operation, a
total of 20.23 percent of the OMS propellants was consumed by the RCS.
Power Reactant Storaae _nd_i..stribut!on Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performance was
nominal with no anomalies or problems noted. A total of 2502 Ibm of oxygen and
315 Ibm of hydrogen was provided to the fuel cells for power generation, and 91 Ibm
of oxygen was provided for crew breathing. At landing, a mission extension capability
of 33 hours at an average power Iovel of 13.9 kW remained.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cell powerplant subsystem performed nominally with a total of 3660 kWh of
electricity generated at an average power level of 13.9 kW. The fuel cells consumed
2502 Ibm Of oxygen and 315 Ibm Of hydrogen, with 2817 Ibm of water being generated.
No fuel _,ell problems or anomalies were noted during the mission.
Auxiliary PowerUnit Subsystem
The APU subsystem performed nominally throughout the STS-64 mission with only one
anomaly noted. The APUS were shut down ih the Order 3, 1,2 tO fulfill the
requirements of DTO 414. The results of DTO 414 are discussed in the Development
Test Objective section of this report. The fuel Consumption and _un-time by APU
position and serial number are Shown in the table on the following page.
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APU 1 (SIN 407) APU 2 (S/N 304) APU 3 (S/N 306)
Flight phase
Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, rain:see consumption,
• ib Ib Ib
Ascent 21:26 ,. 54 21:31 59 21:17 56
FCS checkout 6:35 16
Entry = 61:06 117 77:18 154 61:08 136
Total 82:32 171 98:49 213 89:00 208
• APUs ran for approximately 16 minutes 20 seconds after main gear touchdown.
Hydraulic load tests were performed on all three APUs after landing. The APU
performance was nominal.
STS-64 was the first flight of the titanium thermal isolator sleeve located between the
gear box and the APU fuel pump. The sleeve was incorporated in all three APUs to
replace the previous ceramic sleeve that was incompatible with hydrazine. The fuel
pump soak-back temperatures after ascent were 183 °F, 176 °F, and 175 °F for APUs
1,2, and3, respectively. These temperatures were well below the 210 °F limit.
Also, the APU 1 gearbox repressurized once during entry at approximately
263:21:00 G.m.t. (10:22:37 MET). The gearbox bottle pressure dropped from 187 psia
to 172 psia, and the gearbox pressure increased from about 5.7 psia to 7.0 psia during
the repressurization period. This repressurization did not affect any entry operations.
APU 3 exhaust.gas-temperature (EGT) 2 sensor showed erratic performance during
entry (Flight Problem STS-64-V-04). The sensor was the most likely cause and it will
be replaced prior to the next flight of this vehicle. -
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
The hydraulic:_NSB subsystem performance was nominal during all phases Of the
mission. No PDU backdriving was obserVed in the data from the DTO 414 shut down
test of the APUs after ascent. No problems or anomalies were identified from the data
review. Hydraulics systems load tests were performed after landing, and the hydraulics
systems performed nominally.
Electrical PowerDistribution and Control Subsystem
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed nominally.
At 254:11:55:42 G.m.t. (01:13:32:47 MET), the aft motor control assembly (MCA) 1
operational status bit 4 transitioned from a 1 to a 0 (Flight Problem STS-64--V-01). At
254:15:03:37 G.m.t, (01:17:41:42 MET), the status bit transitioned back to a 1. No
driVe currents were detected on the suppWyingac bus, nor were any posiiion changes
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noted in the controller motors. Also, no change in the aft power cor_tmiler 4 voltage
and current measurements occurred during the transitiOn times. The measurement
(V76X2254E) ischannelized through MDM OA1, card 7, channel 00, and no other
measurements on that channel changed states during the period in question. Had the
indication remained, at least one additional failure would have bee_ required before a
function would have been lost or any corrective action required, This status change did
not impact the mission.
Environmental Control and Llfe Support System
The active thermal control system (ATCS) performed satisfactorily, and all
temperatures were maintained within nominal limits.
The flash evaporator system (FES) supply water system A accumulator temperature
began cycling between 47 °F and 55 °F at approximately 253:17:41 G.m.t.
(00:19:19 MET) (Flight Problem STS-64-V-02), The normal control range for the
thermostat is between 55 °F and 75 °F. A comparison with the B supply accumulator
temperature indicated that the temperature sensor was partially or totally debonded.
The temperature cycles indicate that the heater was operating properly. There was no
impact from this condition as the temperature never approached 32 °F. A heater
reconfiguration to the B heaters was performed at 257:12:52 G.m.t. (04:14:30 MET),
and the same signature was noted, supporting the theory that the temperature sensor
was partially or totally debonded. A postflight inspection is required.
The radiator coldsoak provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus
10 minutes when ammonia system B using the primary/GPC controller was activated.
System B operated for 38 minutes and was deactivated when the cooling cart was
connected to the vehicle. After verification of cooling cart operation was oor_pleted,
the cooling cart was placed in bypass so it would not be cooling the vehicle. Since the
freon coolant loops were still in radiator flow, vehicle cooling was accomplished by
convective cooling of the radiator panels using the payload bay purge. The purge air
temperature was lowered to 45 °F. The ground cooling cart was not used during this
5-day ferry flight preparation period as the radiator inlet temperature never exceeded
104 °F for 45 minutes (SPARTAN film constraint) and no other OMRSD temperature
constraints were violated. All vehicle coOling requirements were satisfactorily met
during this 5-day alternate cooling test.
The supply water and waste management systems performed adequately thrOugt_out
the mission. By the completion of the missiOn, all Of the waste water and supply water
in,fllght checkout requirements were performed and Satisfied.
Supply water was managed through the use of the oVerboard dump system and the
FES. Six supply water dumps were performed, of which two were simultatleous with
waste water dumpS. The supply water dumps were performed at an average dump rate
of 1.56 percent/minute (2,57 Ibimin). The Supply water dump line temperature was
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maintained between 63 °F and 108 oF throughout the mission with operation of the line
heater.
Waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted rate. Four nominal waste
water dumps were performed at an average rate of 1.88 percent/minute (3.1 Ib/min).
The waste water dump line temperature was maintained between 56 °F and 86 OF
throughout the mission, while the vacuum vent line temperature remained between
59 °F and 85 °F and the vacuum vent nozzle remained between 136 °F and 190 °F.
This was the first flight of the supply water dump line purge assembly (SWDLPA). The
SWDLPA was designed to provide an automatic air purge of the supply water dump
line at the completion of each water dump to prevent the clump valve from "burping,"
On previous missions of this vehicle, the burping has been known to occur up to
10 times. An air purge has been used to stop the burping condition on those flights.
Despite the automatic air purge on STS-64, data indicate a singular event of internal
leakage through the supply water dump valve after the third and sixth supply water
dumps. Although this is significantly better than previous missions, some refinement to
procedures will be necessary for future flights.
The waste collection system (WCS) performed nominally throughout the mission with
no problems or anomalies identified.
The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) performed satisfactorily, maintaining the
crew compartment environment with the required specifications. Data were collected
for DTO 664 - Cabin Temperature Survey.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) system performed
normally throughout the duration of the flight. The cabin pressure was allowed to bleed
down to conserve GN2 for a minimum SAFER recharge pressure requirement. At
258:14:32 G.m.t. (05:16:09 MET), the cabin was depressu,_zed to 10.2 psia to support
the planned SAFER EVA. The cabin was repressurized to 14.7 psia, using the
14.7-psia cabin regulators, at 259:21:33 G.m.t. (06:23:10 MET) after the EVA and
redundant component Check were performed. Both systems exhibited normal
operation.
Airlock Supoort System
The airiock system performance was nominal throughout the flight. The alrioCk
depressurization valve was used to depressuri_,e the cabin from 13.15 psia to
10.2 psia. The depressuriZation valVe was also Used to depressurize the alri0ck to
vacuum at 259'.14:27 G.m.t. (06:16:04 MET) in support of the SAFER EVA. After the
EVA, the equalization valve was used to equalize the cabin and airiock preSSures, and
the Cabin pressure regulators were Used tO raise the cabin pressUre to 14.7 psia. The
active System monitor parameters indicated no_'mal outputs throughout the flight.
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Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem
The smoke detection system showed no indications of smoke generation during the
entire flight. Use of the fire suppression system was not required.
Ayionics and Software Systems
The ascent and entry guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) subsystem performed
nominally. The on-orbit GN&C was also nominal during operations in support of the
SPARTAN deployment and retrieval, LITE operations, SPIFEX operations, and the
EVA.
The FCS performed nominally. The touchdown and slapdown was nominal with a
descent rate of less than 2.0 ft/sec at touchdown, and a slapdown rate of approximately
5.5 deg/sec with elevon limiting occurring at -2.5 degrees down. No unusual
oscillations were observed either during the touchdown, slapdown, or rollout phases.
During the landing phase, the Commander achieved the desired 2-second time period
between derotation initiation and a steady-state pitch rate of 1.0 to 1.25 deg/sec before
elevon limiting engaged to allow slapdown at a higher rate.
The high accuracy inertial navigation system (HAINS) inertial measurement units
(IMUs) serial numbers 209, 212, and 216 in slots 1, 2, and 3, respectively, performed
very satisfactorily. For the first time in the Space Shuttle Program, no gyroscope or
accelerometer uplink compensations were required because of the accuracy of these
units. Drift on all units never exceeded one sigma (0.006 deg/hr).
The performance of the star tracker was also nominal with no problems noted,
The OI-23 software was flown for the second time and its performance was nominal.
The only software anomaly noted was found on September 12 during a deorbit
preparations training session on the SMS. A BFS display interface loss condition Was
discovered after a BFS IPL followed by being moded to halt (Flight Problem
STS-64-V-06). When the BFS was later taken from halt to standby and aSsigned a
CRT, the crew noted a big "X" without a "POLL FAIL" on the BFS CRT.
Th "_crew attempted to assign the BFS to Other CRTs, but the BFS showed the same
signature on all CRTs assigned to it. Analysis of the GPC dump eollected during the
simulation showed that the BFS was halted while the MUM was either active or
suspended. The Signature of this c0nditiotl is clearly recognizable, the probability of
occurrence is low, and the BFS Can be recovered by a re-IPL.
Analysis of the BFS software revealed an additional scenario in which a "big X with no
POLL FAIL" can OCcur on a BFS display. This scenario involves a transition back tO
OPS 0 where the MUM gets Suspended prior tO the initiation Ofthe OPS transition. The
transition back tO OPS 0 makes the inc0mpleted task MUM inactive and thus the flag
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MUM DONE is not properly set to continue display updating. This is the same type of
problem described earlier, but the window of exposure is considerably smaller. The
corrective actions for both problems are the same.
The condition (Flight Problem STS-65-V-06) subsequently revealed itself during flight
when, during the conduct of procedures to back out t.f the initial deorbit preparations,
the BFS was moded from Halt to Standby and an X appeared on the CRT display. The
crew performed an IPL and the BFS returned to normal operation.
At 259:21:56 G.m.t. (06:23:34 MET) a "CRT BITE 1" message was annunciated. The
BITE was attributed to a previously defined condition (User Note 55331) in which two
key strokes are made in rapid succession. The crew implemented the display
electronic unit (DEU) malfunction procedures and reported nO BITE indication in the
contents of the BITE registers when the Item B of the operational test procedure (OTP)
was executed; As specified in User Note, Item D should be used to view the contents
of the BITE register buffer location where the error information is preserved. When a
critical BITE occurs, the contents of the BITE registers are stored in a buffer area in the
DEU memory. When the DEU is subsequently polled, the error information is returned
in the poll response, and the registers are then cleared so that the registers only
contain the information until the first poll following the occurrence of the error. Item B
of the OTP displays the contents of the BITE registers, which have been cleared as a
result of the GPC polling the DEU, and this explains why the BITE registers were
nominal. The GPC polling indicates that the error condition seen in the poll response
was a transient condition.
The displays and controls subsystem performed satisfactorily; however, one payload
bay floodlight (mid starboard or aft port) showed evidence of arcing during the payload
bay door closure for both landing attempts. The light appeared to be functioning
properly.
Communications and Trackinq Subsystem
The communications and tracking subsystem operated acceptably throughout the
mission. A number of problems and anomalies were identified; hOwever, none of these
impacted the mission.
S-band communications were lost for four minutes after MECO during the handovei'
from Wallops Island to the TDRS East. Analysis shows that the Orbiter vehicle
subsystems were performing properly throughout this peri0d. Similar losses of the
Orbiter return link were also noted on STS-52 and STS-53. Posfflight trOubleshooting
of the TDRS network was Conducted after landing.
In addition, there were two instances when the Orbiter return link was lost while the
forward link remained Operational. The losses have been attributed to prOblems in the
software at the second TDRS ground torminal.
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The Ku-band radar failed to lock on the SPARTAN payload following deployment
(Flight Problem STS-64-V-05). The Ku-band passed several self-tests during the first
hour after deployment with nominal results. Multiple searches were performed in both
the GPC and Auto modes with the output power in high and low and the range set in
minimum and automatic, all without success. Approximately one hour after SPARTAN
deploymenti the Ku-band acquired the target, and remained looked on until the
commu.nications mode _,_asselected. The Ku-band radar acquired the SPARTAN at
128,000 ft during retrieval activities, with lock-on remaining until 81 ft. All Ku-band
operations during rendezvous were nominal.
During SPARTAN deployment operations, the berthing camera failed to operate (Flight
Problem STS-64-F-03). Analysis has shown that the label on the A7 panel for the
push-button that selects the SPARTAN berthing camera was placed on the wrong
push-button. The PL3 button, which was labeled as a video tape recorder, was the
correct button. The camera worked properly when the correct button was depressed.
There were two instances when the Orbiter return link was lost while the forward link
remained operational. The first loss occurred when acquiring the TDRS West, and the
second occurred several orbits later four minutes after an early handover to the TDRS
East. The losses were caused by a software problem at the second TDRS ground
terminal when the hourly vectOr was initiated too close to the service-start time and time
was not available for proper processing of the vector, A workaround was established to
prevent an hourly vector from being accepted within 10 minutes of service-start time.
Following this change, no additional occurrences of the anomaly were noted.
During landing, just prior to navigation selecting TACAN data, TACAN 1 experienced a
40.degree bearing data shift and RM deselected TACAN 1 bearing data. Immediately
after the TACAN 1 bearing data was deselected, TACAN 1 bearing data recovered and
operated nominally for the remainder of landing.
Operational Instrumentation/Modular Auxillarv. Data System
The operational instrumentation (OI) and modular auxiliary data system (MADS)
operated nominally.
The FES supply water system A accumulator temperature cycled between 48 OFand
55 °F for most of the mission. Analysis showed that this condition was most probably
caused by a debonded temperature sensor. A more detailed discussion Of this
ariomaly is cor_tained in the Environmental Control and Life Support section of this
report.
At apprOximately 256:13:54:00 G.m.t. (03:15:31:05 MET), the crew selected the
"quiescent" format (17), which was then loaded into payload data interleaver (PDi)
decommutat0v =4. The BITE bits for decommutator 4 went high and those for
decommuta_o_' 1 went low as expected. About two minutes later, the crew selected the
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"regular" format; the BITE bits for decommutator 1 went high again as expected, but
only the bit rate accuracy bit for decommutator 4 BITE went low (Flight Problem
STS-64-V-07). The bit-lock, word-lock, and master-frame-lock bits for decommutator 4
went low approximately 22 minutes later at 256:14:20:00 G.m.t. (03:15:57:0S MET). No
payload data were lost by this occurrence, nor was any data loss anticipated if the
event should recur. Posfflight troubleshooting is required to resolve this anomaly.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed nominally throughout the
mission with no problems or anomalies identified. The drag chute was deployed
nominally and performed as designed. The landing and braking data are shown in the
following table.
Landinq and Brakinq parameters
From
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate,ft/seo Pitchrate,
ft keas deg/sec
Main gear touchdown 3386 198.3 ~ 1,0 N/A
Nose gear touchdown 7192 153.8 N/A -5.8
Brake initiation speed
Brake-on time
Rollout distance
Rollout time
Runway
Orbiter weight at landing
Peak
Brake sensor pressure, Brake assembly
127.5 knots (keas)
44.2 seconds
9,656 feet
61.5 secOnds
0433 (Concrete) EAFB
212,179.5 Ib
Energy,
location
Left-hand inboard 1
Left-hand inboard 3
Left-hand outboard 2
Left-hand outboard 4
Right-hand inboard 1
Right-hand in.board 3
Right-hand Outboard 2
Right-hand outboard 4
psia
714
714
714
674
753
938
674
78O
Left-hand Outboard
I,.eft-hand inboard
Right-hand inboard
Right-hand outboard
million ft-ib
9.29
I. 12.20
23.62
16.96
Intearated Aerodynamics1 Heating _nd Thermal Interf_9_Q
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal with no problems or anomalies
identified. DTO 254 - Subsonic AerOdynamics Verification - was performed during final
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Lapproach. The results are discussed in the Development Test Objective section of this
report.
The aerodynamic and plume heating during the ascent phase were nominal, based on
the evaluation of the vehicle telemetry data and the physical appearance of the plumes.
The entry aerodynamic heating was also nominal; however, heating calculations and
data evaluation are continuing.
The performance of the thermal interfaces was satisfactory with all temperatures and
pressures maintained within limits. In addition, the aft compartment helium
concentration showed that all leakages in that area were within the experience base.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The performance of the thermal control subsystem was nominal during all phases of the
mission, and all Orbiter subsystem temperatures were maintained within acceptable
limits.
Aerothermodynamics
The entry acreage heating, as well as local heating, were within nominal limits and
indicated average heat loads. All structural temperatures were maintained within limits
and thermal protection subsystem (TPS) damage was average. The structural-
temperature rises were within the experience base, and the rises were symmetrical on
the right and left wing.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The TPS performed satisfactorily. Based on structural temperature response data
(temperature rise), the entry heating was above average, but not beyond previous flight
experience. Boundary layer transitioP frOm laminar to turbulent flow occurred
1270 seconds after entry interface (El) on the forward centerline of the vehicle. At the
aft right and left sides of the vehicle, transition Occurred at 1255 seconds, and was
symmetrical from right to left on the vehicle.
The crew reported that an AFRSI blanket on the port OMS pod was partially detached
near the AFRSI/LRSI interface. Downlinked video provided a detailed view0f the
AFRSI blanket damage. A small triangular tear in the blanket Coating about 2 in. by
0.75 in. was seen at the interface between the tiles and the blanket. The batting
beneath tlte tom cloth appeared to be intact. Similar damages to this particular blanket
have occurred (ref. STS-50, 0V-102, LP05) with no resulting damage to the underlying
StrUcture. The blanket is through-stitched on 1-inch centers, so the araB. of the cover
damage could not ir_crease. The blanket damage seer_ in this View did not represent
an on=orbit or entry _onCem.
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Based on a runway and a Mate/Demate Device inspection of the TPS, overall debris
damage was slightly above average. The number of hits on the lower surface greater
than one inch was slightly higher than average. Data indicate that the Orbiter had a
total of at least 173 hits of which 22 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. This
total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield that are attributed to
the flame arrestment sparkler system.
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 116 hits of which 18 had a major
dimension of one inch or greater. A total of 57 hits were found just aft of the liquid
hydrogen umbilical door with four of the hits having a major dimension greater than one
inch. The upper surface of the Orbiter had one hit, the right side had seven hits with
one hit having a major dimension greater than 1 inch, the left side had two hits, the
right OMS pod had 16 hits, and the left OMS pod had eight hits,
Two sections of the mechanically attached main-landing-gear door (MLGD) thermal
barrier (18 inches in length), including the carrier panel, were missing from the aft
inboard area of both the right and left main gear wells (Flight Problem STS-64-V-08) at
landing. These items fell from the vehicle during main gear deployment and were
found approximately 4,000 ft from the runway 04 threshold. Neither of the barriers
showed any damage, and no carrier plate damage was evident. Each barrier assembly
is normally clipped in place for flight; however, a review of the enlarged closeout photos
taken prior to the mission ShOw that the spring clips, which lock the thermal barriers in
place, were not engaged on the right-hand thermal barrier. The loss of both thermal
barriers is attributed to improper installation. The right-hand thermal barrier apparently
caused five damage sites on the tile just aft of that location.
The nose cap and chin panel tile areas were in good condition. The nose landing gear
door (NLGD) thermal barriers were in good condition with a 1-inch breach noted. A tile
on the aft right-hand edge of the NLGD lost a 2.5 inch by 0.75 inch repair.
Light window hazing was reported on windows 3 and 4, with a number of streaks were
evident on window 4. Debris hits were found on the peripheral tiles around windows 2,
3, 4, and 5.
The MLGD thermal barriers (new) were in good condition other than the two barrier
segments that fell out. No thermal damage was noted in the _.rea, supporting the
postulation that the barriers fell out when the MLGDs were opened.
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The damaged AFRSI blanket On the left-hand OMS pod showed little or no
degradation. The ET door thermal barriei's were in satisfactory condition; however, a
1.5-inch by 1.0,inch repair was missing from an ET door tile. The elevon/eleVon gap
tiles were in good condition, with a protruding gap filler on the right-hand side. The
engine dome-mounted heat shield blankets looked good except for minor cover
damage on SSME 1 at the 6 o'ClOck position. Base heat shield peppering was nominal.
No damage occurred tO tiles as a result Of the drag chute deployment.
REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM
The remote manipulator system (RMS) performed very satisfactorily throughout the
flight. The RMS checkout procedure was initiated at 253:17:29 G.m.t. (00:19:06 MET).
The checkout, which required about 47 minutes to complete, verified that the RMS was
functioning properly. At 253:20:22 G.m.t. (00:22:00 MET), the first day of SPIFEX
operations began with the grappling and unberthing of the SPIFEX boom; however,
experiment operations were delayed about 1 hour 20 minutes because of SPIFEX
problems. A total of 34 test positions were completed before the RMS was placed in
the overnight park position.
During several of the RCS firings for the SPIFEX operations, some small degree Of
brake slippage was noted. This slippage had been predicted prior to flight and was not
considered a problem. However, in one instance, a brake slip annunciation was
received because of the cumulative slip from two thruster firings. While each brake slip
was about 0.3 degree, which does not trigger the alarm, the cumulative slip was greater
than the 0.5-degree threshold of the annunciation. The preflight analysis had not
considered that Several test points required several thruster firings with the RMS in the
same position, and that means that the brake slip function was not reset between
thruster firings.
STS-64 was the first RMS flight with the OI-23 software, which also incorioorated the
position orientation hold select (POHS) mode of operation for the RMS. Although there
were minimal manual augmented mode operations during the flight, the data indicate
that the POHS behaved as expected. The steady-state position accuracy was well
within the 1-inch and 0.S-degree requirement. A review of the data shows that the RMS
performed as expected during the POHS operations.
On flight day 3, the RMS was again used to perform SPIFEX operations. A total of
33 additional test positions was completed. Brake slippage was noted during some
RCS firings, but it was expected. The RMS was again parked for the night. Flight day
4 activities included the last two test positions prior to the SPARTAN-201 OperatiOns
and the SAFER EVA. The SPIFEX was reberthed for later use during the extension
day.
On flight day 5_ the SPARTAN-201 activities were initiated in preparation for the
release of the satellite. The SPARTAN-201 was released at 256:21:30 G.m.t.
(03:23:07 MET)_ and the Orbiter performed two separation maneuvers.
After an utleventful rendezvous on flight day 7, the SPARTAN=201 was grappled at
258:21:01 G.m.t. (06:22:38 MET), On flight day 8, the RMS was used by the EVA crew
members during an evaluation of the SAFER unit.
Fiight <lay 9 Was added to the mission as an experiments day because of the
conservation of Consumables during previous days of the mission. The remaining
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SPIFEX test positions that were not completed on the fourth flight day were
accomplished. The SPIFEX was berthed, the RMS was returnedto the stowed position
and cradled.
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GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT/FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT
The Government furnished equipment (GFE)/fllght crew equipment (GFE/FCE)
performed very satisfactorily except as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Following the completion of post-insertion procedures, the _rew reported that the side-
hatch locking device could not be installed because of an obstruction (Flight Problem
STS-64-F-02). One of the crew members carries this device in the pocket of his/her
suit, and the device is installed as one of the first activities after aS0ent. The crew
downlinked video of the area involved, and analysis of the video did not clearly show
the cause of the obstruction. Postflight inspection and analysis showed that the locking
device was oversized when compared to the drawing. This particular device had not
been flown nor fit-checked previously; consequently, this error had not been found.
At approximately 255:18:00 G.m.t. (02:19:38 MET), the Commander reported a problem
when filling some of the drink bags (Flight Problem STS-64-F-01). The problem drink
bags have a restricted septum caused by excessive heat application during
manufacture that caused the partial collapse of the channel in the septum adapter
assembly. Testing has shown that approximately 50 percent of the drink bags
suspected of having this problem had a collapsed channel. This restriction resulted in
a smaller-than-normal quantity of water entering the bag. The crew was briefed on
methods for dealing with this problem prior to the flight.
During SPARTAN deployment operations, the berthing camera failed to operate (Flight
Problem STS-64-F-03). Analysis has shown that the label on the A7 panel push-button
that activates the SPARTAN berthing camera was placed on the wrong push-button.
The PL3 button, which was labeled as a video tape recorder, was the correct button.
The camera worked properly when the correct button was depressed.
During SPARTAN deployment operations, the TCS (Development Test Objective
J_,), had problems acquiring SPARTAN as a target. The problem was traced to a
Y cable between the TCS and the PGSC (Flight Problem STS-64-F-04). A plan was
developed and upiinked to the crew to swap the connectors on the Y cable. This was
accomplished, and the TCS was oper=tional for SPARTAN retrieval.
The RMS elbow Camera exhibited periodic horizontal jitter beginning at
259:15:12 G.m.t. (06:17:50 MET). At 259:16:34 G.m.t. (06:18:12 MET), the camera
temperature had increased 5 oF and the camera was Operating properly.
EXTRAVEHICULAR. A_TIVITY
The EMU checkout was successfully compteted on flight day 6 with no anomalies.
During the checkout, both EMUs functioned properly, all communications modes were
verified to be operational, and the EMUs were ready tO support contingency EVA
operations on flight day 6, but no continger_cy EVA was required.
The crewmembers donned their EMUs and power was applied at 259:12:00 G.m.t.
(06:13:28 MET). The communications checks required about 25 minutes to complete,
and biomedical data were being received on the ground, but the data were not being
processed. After a change in the Mission Control Center tO the correct telemetry format
load (TFL)_ the Flight Surgeon verified that good data were received and processed.
Because the cabin depressurization to 10.2 psia had occurred less than 24 hours
earlier, the prebreathe period was increased from 40 minutes to 50 minutes. The
50-minute iti-suit prebreathe period was completed and the hatoh was opened at
259:14:39:28 G.m.t. (06:16:16:33 MET). The EVA officially began at
259:14:42:00 G.m.t. (06:16:19:05 MET) when the EMUs went on internal power. The
two crewmembers began the first untethered EVA since 1984, and the twenty-eighth
EVA of the Space Shuttle Program.
The main purpose of the EVA was to test the SAFER unit (DTO 661). This unit is an
emergency rescue system designed by JSC to provide a return capability for an
astronaut who may become separated from the Orbiter or Space Station. The SAFER
unit is approximately 1/4 of the weight of the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU). It
carries three pounds of nitrogen that can be fed through 24 thrusters for up to one
minute at a time to move an adrift astronaut at up to 10 ft/sec.
After a short familiarization period for becoming accustomed to working in the space
environment with the SAFER, each crew member performed an engineering evaluation,
an EVA self-rescue demonstration, and finally an overall flight quality evaluation, which
entailed a demonstration of precision flying by tracking the RMS arm. The final task of
the EVA was the articulating portable foot restraint (APFR) evaluation. During the first
engineering evaluation, spin rates as high as 40 deg/se¢ were imparted (30 deg/seo
planned preflight) to the EV1 crewmember, and the crewmember was able to stabiliZe
himself frOm this spin rate.
The EVA was conducted in a benign thermal environment, and the metabolic rates
reflected this condition. During the crew debriefing, the EV2 crewmember reported that
his feet got extremely cold.
Dudng the EVA, Seven r_itrogen rech_.rges Ofthe SAFER unit were performed. The
RMS was used extenSively during the SAFER evaluation, and all systems performed
nominally. After Completion Of the planned SAFER EVA activities, the crew members
ingressed the airiock. The EMUs were connected to Orbiter power at
3S
259:21:31:21 G.m.t. (06:23:08:26 MET) for a total official EVA time of 6 hours
51 minutes.
Two EVA equipment anomalies were noted during the EVA. The articulating portable
foot restraint (APFR) thermal cover interfered with the full insertion of the APFR
simulator into the SPARTAN mission peculiar experiment support structure (MPESS)
portable foot restraint (PFR) socket during the APFR Ioad-limiter evaluation (Flight
Problem STS-64-F-05). The thermal cover was peeled back and the APFR simulator
fitted properly. Also, two electronic cuff checklist (ECC) anomalies were noted during
the EVA (Flight Problem STS-64-F-06). The ECC-1 did not always respond when the
upper middle sextant was depressed. Secondly, during an attempt to update the.
contents of ECC-2, a '_VRITE ROM ERROR" message was displayed on the payload
general support oomputer (PGSC) by the update application. ECG-2 was still usable
for the EVA as the crew proceeded with the update despite the error message.
A discussion of the SAFER unit evaluation is contained in the Development Test
Objective section of this report.
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CARGO INTEGRATION
All cargo integration hardware performed nominally and no anomalies or problems
were noted.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVE/DET,AI_:ED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVE
L
A total of 24 Development Test Objectives (DTOs) and 17 Detailed Supplementary
Objectives (DSOs) were assigned to the STS-64 mission. Data were collected on 22 of
the 24 DTOs and on all 17 of the DSOs. The following paragraphs discuss the results
of each DTO and DSO, if the results are known.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 254 - Subsonic Aerodynamics Verification - This DTO was performed during the
final approach to runway 04 at Edwards Air Force Base, CA. Postflight data evaluation
is required because the data are recorded on the MADS recorder which is dumped
posfflight. Data were given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be
published in separate documentation.
DTO 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - This DTO was performed during
the ascent phase of the mission. Posfflight data evaluation is required because the
data were recorded on the MADS recorder which is dumped posfflight. The data were
given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published in separate
documentation.
DTO 305D - Ascent Compartment Venting Evaluation - This DTO was performed during
the ascent phase of the mission. Posfflight data evaluation is required because the
data were recorded on the MADS recorder which is dumped posfflight. The data were
given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published in separate
documentation.
DTO 306D - Descent Compartment Venting Evaluation - This DTO was performed
during the entry phase of the mission. Posfflight data evaluatiOn is required because
the data were recorded on the MADS recorder which is dumped posfflight. The data
were given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published in separate
documentation.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - This DTO was perfor_ned during the entry
phase of the mission. Posfflight data evaluation is required because the data were
recorded On the MADS recorder which is dumped posfflight. The data were given to
the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published in separate doc_'nenlation.
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance (Method 3) - Photography of the STS-64 ET (after
separation) was attempted. Eleven exposures were made on magaZine i. The ET with
the moon in the background is imaged on one frame (03). The +X/-Z side Of the ET is
Visible. Approximately 10 divots are visible on the LH2tank/intertank CloseOut flange. A
divot is alSo visible on the LH2tank acreage just aft of the intertank closeout flange. A
white object (probably frOzen hydrogen) is imaged On frames 4 and 5. The single
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exposure of the ET is good, and timing data are present on the film. There is a slight
blurring of the image that was probably caused by soft focus or motion smear. The 11
exposures were taken over a 1-minute 44-second period.
Video of the STS-64 ET after separation was not acquired by the crew.
DTO 319D - Orbiter/Payload Acceleration and Acoustics Environment Data - Data
were acquired at the planned times. Posfflight data evaluation is required because the
data were recorded on the MADS recorder which is dumped posfflight. The data were
given to the sponsor for ev_.luation, and the results will be published in separate
documentation.
DTO 414 - APU Shutdown Test (Sequence A) -This DTO was performed to continue
the investigation into an anomalous 40-second hydraulics system 3 supply pressure
hang-up observed when APU 3 was shut down early during ascent on STS-54. The
DTO was performed with an APU shutdown sequence of 3, 1, and 2,with at least
5 seconds between APU shutdowns. No anomalous pressure hang-ups or power drive
unit (PDU) back-driving were noted.
DTO 520 - Edwards Lakebed Runway Bearing Strength and Rolling Friction
Assessment for Orbiter Landings - This DTO was not perf0rmed as the landing was on
concrete runway 04 at Edwards Air FOrce Base.
DTO 524 - Landing Gear Loads and Brake Stability Evaluation (Data Collection Only) -
Data were collected for this DTO and have been g_en to the sponsor for later
evaluation.
DTO 659 - EDO Treadmill Evaluation (Preflight plans requite no power) (Configuration
2) - The Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) treadmill performed well in the unpowered
state as well as the powered configuration. After energy became available on flight
days 9 and 10, treadmill Operations were accomplished in the powered-up
configuration.
DTO 661 - Simplified Aid for Extravehicular Activity Rescue - The SAFER unit was
designed and developed by Johnson Space Center (JSC). The SAFER unit is a small,
self-contained, propulsiVe backpack device that provided free-flying mobility for a
space-walker. A stranded detached space-walker can perform a self-rescue in the
event no other means of rescue are available.
The SAFER unit was attached to the space suit's portable life support system backpack
and became, in essence, a scaled-down fniniatuw'eversion of the MMU flown on the
Space Shuttle in 1984.
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During the EVA, seven nitrogen recharges of the SAFER unit were performed.
RMS was used extensively durin=7the SAFER unit evaluation, and all systems
performed nominally.
The
DTO 664 - Cabin Temperature Survey - The planned measurements of cabin
temperature were taken, and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
Results of this DTO will be published in separate documentation.
DTO 671 - EVA Hardware for Future Scheduled EVA Missions - This hardware was
tested during the SAFER EVA. Evaluations of each piece of hardware were given to
the sponsors during postflight debriefings. The results will be published in separate
reports.
DTC) 672 - EVA Electronic Cuff Checklist - The ECC was used during the EVA. The
ECC 1 touch-screen upper middle sextant did not consistently respond. However,
during post-EVA activities, the screen responded normally. Secondly, only I of 6
pages were able to be transferred from the PGSC to ECC 2. Postflight inspections will
be required to determine the cause of these problems.
DTO 673 - EDO Rower Ergometer Evaluation (Preflight plans require no power)
(Configuration 2) - Data for this DTO have been given to the sponsor. The results of
the evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 674 - Thermo-Electric Liquid Cooling System Evaluation (for two crewmembers) -
The launch/entry suit (LES) thermo-electric (TE) cooling unit data logger displayed a
spurious flashing signature on its LCD during deactivation on-orbit. During the
deactivation, two resets were performed and the recorder was powered down in
accordance with the instructions located on the data logger. Checkout of the data
logger was considered a secondary objective of DTO 674, and the logger was used to
gather performance data from the cooling system. The problem that occurred during
the deactivation of the data logger did not affect the performance of the coOling system.
The spurious flashing signature most probably resulted from completely depressing
only one of Iw.omembrane-type buttons that should have been pressed simultaneously.
DTO 700-2 - Laser Range and Range Rate Device - The Laser Range and Range
Rate Device was used during the SPARTAN deployment and retrieval. The crew
reported that the hand-held Light DiStance and Ranging (LIDAR) data compared well
with the radar and the navigation filter results. The results have been given tO the
sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be published in separate
documentation.
DTO 700-5 - Payload Bay Mounted RendezvOus Radar- During SPARTAN deployment
operations, the TCS) had problems acquiring the SPARTAN as a target. The pr0blem
was traced to a Y-cable between the TCS and PGSC (l_light Problem STS,64-F-04). A
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plan was uplinked to the crew to exchange the connectors on the Y cable. This was
done and the TCS was operational for SPARTAN retrieval.
DTO 700-7 - Orbiter Data for Real-Time Navigation Evaluation - The Orbiter Data for
Real-Time Navigation Evaluation experiment was used in conjunction with DTOs 700-2
and 836. Based on the response from the latter two DTOs, this DTO apparently
performed as expected. The data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation and
the results of that evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - The Crosswind Landing Performance
was not performed as the winds were not of sufficient magnitude.
DTO 830 - The Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment - The Shuttle Plume
Impingement Flight Experiment (SPIFEX) was designed and built at JSC, for the study
of the characteristics and behavior of exhaust plumes during RCS thruster firings. The
unit, when picked up by the RMS, was a 33-foot extension for the arm and contained a
package of instruments that measured the near-field, transition, and far-field effects of
thruster plumes. The plume information gathered by the experiment will assist planners
in understanding the potential effects of thruster plumes on large space structures,
such as the Russian Space Agency's Mir Space Station and the International Space
Station, during future Shuttle docking and rendezvous operations.
The SPIFEX was moved by a series of complex mechanical RMS maneuvers to take
measurements of 86 separate test firings of the RCS thrusters at 60 different locations.
-The SPIFEX was first grappled at 253:20:40 G.m.t. (00:02:17 MET), with unberthing
occurring three minutes later. Prior to the first berthing on flight day 4, 80 of 86
_-preplanned test points plus an additional two test points had been completed. As
predicted, a dual thruster (F1F and F2F) firing caused the boom to move about
6 inches and the RMS wrist brake to slip. On the energy-dependent extension day,
flight day 9, SPIFEX was again unberthed and an additional 18 test points were
achieved before the boom was berthed for entry at 260'.21:07 G.m.t. (07:22:44 MET).
On the initial start-up of the SPiFEX, communications with the data system were
acquired and then were lost. Cycling the Circuit breaker allowed communications to be
re-established with the boom. This problem occurred a number of times, and each time
the system was recovered With a power cycle. Health-monitoring data showed all
Systems were in excellent health. Data download interruptions interfered with the data
transfer to the PGSC. The problem was believed to be caused by the high baud rate
being shipped through the RMS. All data were eventually transfer'red tO the PGSC. On
the energy-dependent eXtension day, the System did not acquire power. Recovery of
the power Occurred after the PGSC was rebooted and connectOrs demated and mated.
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DTO 832 - Target of Opportunity Navigation Sensors - Data were acquired at the
planned times. Posfflight data evaluation is required. The data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be published in separate documentation.
DTO 836 - Tools for Rendezvous and Docking Test 1 and 2 - The requirements of the
Tools for Rendezvous and Docking (TRAD) DTO, for STS-64 only, were fulfilled by the
requirements specified in DTO 700-2, 700-5, and 700-7. The data have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation, and the results will be reported in separete documentation.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 482 - Cardiac Rhythm Disturbances During Extravehicular Activity - Data
collected during the EVA for the Cardiac Rhythm Disturbances during EVA have been
given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation Will be published in
separate documentation.
DSO 483 - Back Pain Pattern in Microgravity - Data were Collected for this DSO, and
these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evalUatiOn
will be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers - Data were collected for this
DSO during the preflight and posfflight periods. These data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DSO 489 - EVA Dosimetry Evaluation - Data were collected during the EVA for this
DSO, and these d_.ta have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that
evaluation will be reported in separate doCumentatiOn.
DSO 491 - Characterization of Microbial Transfer Among Crewmembers - Data were
collected during the preflight and p0sfflight periods. These data have been given tO the
sponsor for eValuation, and the results of that evalUatiOn will be repOrted in separate
documentation.
DSO 603 - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress (603C Schedule) -
Data were Collected during the planned periods, and these data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be reported in separate
doCumentation.
t_I_ DSO 604 - Visuai,Vestlbular Integration asa42F_unctiOnOf Adaptation [OI,3(b)] - Data
were collected as planned, and these data have been given to the sponsor for
eValuation. The results Of that evaluation Wiil be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 605 - Posturai Equilibrium Control During Landing/Egress - Data were collected
during the preflight and posffiight periods for this DSO. These data have been given tO
:t
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the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DSO 610 - In-Flight Assessment of Renal Stone Risk - In-flight samples were collected
for this DSO. These samples were evaluated during posfflight operations and the
results have been given to the sponsor. The results of that evaluation will be reported
in separate documentation.
DSO 612 - Energy Utilization - Data were collected for this DSO. These data have
been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of this experiment will be
reported in separate documentation. The glucometer, Ketone sticks, and Metabolic
Gas Analysis System were not flown on STS-64.
DSO 614 - The Effect of Prolonged Space Flight on Head and Gaze Stability During
• Locomotion (Protocol B) - Preflight and post/light data were collected, and these data
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that evaluation will be
reported in separate documentation.
DSO 621 - In-Flight Use of Florinef to Improve Orthostatic Intolerance Post/light - Data
were collected during preflight and posfflight operations in support of this DSO. These
data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of that evaluation
will be reported in separate aoc,Jmentation.
DSO 624 - Preflight and Postflight Measurement of Cardiorespiratory Responses to
Submaximal Exercise - Data were collected during preflight and posfflight exercise
periods and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of
that evaluation will be repOrted in separate documentation.
DSO 626 - Cardiovascular and Cerebrovasculat Responses to Standing Before and
After Space Flight - Data were collected during the preflight and postflight operations,
and these data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of that
evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 901 - DOcumentary Television - Video was collected throughout the flight in
support of this DSO. These data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation, and
the results of that evaluation will be reported in separate documentation.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Photographic data were
collected as time permitted throughout the flight in support of this DSO. These data
have been given tO the sponsor for evaluation. The results Of that evaluation wiil be
reported in separate documentation.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still PhotOgraphy - Ph0tographic data were coliected as time
permitted thrOughoUt the flight in support Of this DSO. These data have been given to
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the sponsor for evaluation, and theresults of that evaluation will be reported in
separate documentation.
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
On launch day, 22 videos of the launch activities were screened and no anomalous
conditions were noted. The following day, 52 of 54 planned films of launch activities
were also screened. Film from two cameras was lost because of camera problems. No
anomalies were noted in the review of the launch film.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
An assessment was made of two items that were viewed on a downlink of video taken
by the payload bay cameras during a survey of the vehicle condition. A damaged tile
was reported by the crew on the port-side OMS pod and a white piece of debris was
noted on the starboard side of the vertical stabilizer. Neither of these conditions was
considered anomalous and both were of no concern for entry.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
Five videos of the Orbiter's approach and landing were reviewed. No anomalies were
detected. Fifteen landing films were reviewed, and no anomalies were noted. Drag
chute operations appeared to bc .Iominal from the photographic data review.
m
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TABLE I.- STS-64 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
APU Activation
SRB HPU Activation =
Main Propulsion System
Start =
SRB Ignition Command
(Liftoff)
Throttle up to
100 Percent Thrust =
Throttle down to
67 Percent Thrust =
Maximum Dynamic
Pressure (q)
Throttle up to
104 Percent Thrust =
Both SRM's Chamber
Pressure at 50 psis
End SRM Action =
SRB Physical
Separation =
SRB Separation
Command =
Throttle I_own for 3g
Acceleration =
3g Acceleration
Throttle Down to
67 Percent Thf'ust for
Cutoff a
SSME Shutdown =
Description
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LH HPU System A start command
LH HPU System B start command
RH HPU System A start command
RH HPU System B start command
ME-3 start command accepted
ME-2 start command accepted
ME-1 start command accepted
CalCulated SRB ignition command
ME-3 command
ME-2 command
ME-1 command
accepted
accepted
accepted
ME-3 command accepted
ME.2 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
Derived ascent dynamic pressure
ME-3 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
RH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
SRB separation command flag
ME-3 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
Total load factor (g)
ME-3 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-3 shutdown
ME-2 shutdown
ME-1 shutdown
commattd accepted
commat_d accepted
cornmand accepted
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Actual time, G.m.t.
252:22:18:02.84
252:22:18:03.79
252:22:18:05.00
252:22:22:27.102
252:22:22:28.262
252:22:22:28.382
252:22:22:28.542
252:22:22:48.,. 13
252:22:22:48.535
252:22"2:_:48.657
252:22:22:54.982
252:22:22:58.694
252:22:22:58.695
252:22:22:58.698
252:22:23:21.094
252:22:23:2i .095
252;22:23:21.098
252:22:23:46
252:22:23:56.615
252:22:23:56.616
252'22:23:56.619
252:22:24:52.502
252:22:24:52.622
252:22:24:54.862
252:22:24:54.992
252:22:24:57.462
252:22:24:57.462
252:22:24:58
252:22:30:26.082
252:22:30:26.102
252:22:30:26.108
252:22:30:27.9
252:22:31:23.363
252:22:31:23.383
252:22:31:23.390
252:22:31:29.643
252:22:3"J :29.664
2_2:22:31:29.670
TABLE I.- STS-64 SEOUENCEOF EVENTS
Event
"MECO
ET Separation
APU Deactivation
OMS 2 Ignition
-OMS 2 Cutoff
"'PLBD Open
..SPIFEX First Grapple
8PIFEX First Unberth
SPIFEX First Berth
SPIFEX First Release
SPARTAN First Grapple
SPARTAN Unberth
SPARTAN First Release
Description
MECO command flag
MECO confirm flag
ET separation command fla.g
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
Right engine bi-propellant valve
position
Left engine bi-propellant valve
position
Right engine bi-pr0pellant valve
position
Left engine bi-propellant valve
position
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
Payload captured
Payload Select 1 latch 2B released
Payload select 1 latch 2B latched
Payload captured
Actual time, G.m.t.
252:22:31:30
252:22:3 ! :30
252:22:31:49
252:22_39:22.37
252:22:39:28.76
252:22:39:35.44
252:22:59:04.0
252:22:59:04.0
252:23:01:09.7
252:23:01:09.9
252:23:52:17
252:23!53:37
253:20:33:08
253:20:41:32
255:15:56:02
255:15:59:14
SPARTAN Second
Grappl e
SPARTAN Berth
SPARTAN Second
Release
Payload captured
Payload select 2 latch 1A released
Payload captured
Payload captured
Payload
Payload captured
select 1 latch 2A latched
256:20:40:20
2,56;2_0:48:24
. 256:2.'__:29:57
258:21:00:55
258:22:28:04
258:22:29:51
Cabin Depressurization
OMS 3 Ignition
OMS 3 Cutoff
OMS 4 Ignition
OMS 4 Cutoff
Cabin pressure
Left engine bi,propellant valve
position
Right engine hi-propellant valve
position
Left engine bi-prOpellant valve
position
Right engine bi-pr0pellant valve
position
Left engine bi-propellant valve
position
Right engihe bi-pr0peIlar_t valve
positiOn
Left engine bi-ptopellar_t Valve
position
Right engine bi-propellar_t valve
position
258:14:32115
N/A
258:22:51:47.0
N/A
258:22:52:04.8
258:23:36:47.1
N/A
258:23:37:04.9
N/A
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TABLE I.- STS-64 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
°. ,
Event
Airlock Depressurization
Airlock Repressurization
Cabin Repressurization
SPIFEX Second Grapple
SPIFEX Second Unberth
SPIFEX Second Berth
SPIFEX Second Release
FCS Checkout
APU ACtivation
APU Deactivation
First PLBD Close
Description
Ajrlock differential pressure 1
_,irlock differential pressure 1
Cabin pressure
Payload captured
Payload select 1 latch 3A released
Payload select 1 latch 1B latched
Payload captured
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
PLBD left close 1
Actual time, G.m.t.
259:14:39:14
259:21:33:16
259:22:32:10
260:13:45:17
260:13:49:21
260:21:07:04
260:21:09:02
261:13:29:07.48
261:13:35:43.09
262:14:47:17
PLBD right close 1
Second PLBD Open PLBD right open 1 BFS
PLBD left open 1 BFS
PLBD left closeSecond PLBD Close
262:14:49:33
262:18:35:52
262:18:37:11
262:14:38:16
APU Activation for Entry
Deorbit Burn Ignition
De0rbit Burn Cutoff
Entry Interface
Blackout End
Terminal Area Energy
Management (TAEM)
Main Landing Gear
Contact
Main Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Deploynlent
Nose Landing Gear
Corltact
Nose Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
_.Drag Chute JettiSOn
PLBD right close
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Right engine bi-propellant valve
position
Left engine bi-propellant valve
position
Right engine bi-propellant valve
position
Left engine bi-propellant valve
position
Orbital altitude/reference ellipsoid
Data locked at high sample rate
Major Mode Code (305)
MLG left-hand outboard tire
pressure 1
MLG right-hand outboard tire
pressure 2
MLG right-hand no weight on
wheels
MLG left-hand no weight on
wheels
Drag chute deploy 1 cap volts
Nose landirlg gear right-hand tits
pressure 1
NOse landing gear no weight on
wheels
DJ'ag chute jettison 1 cap volts
263:14:49:35
263:20:12:01.79
263:20:28:09.21
263:20:28:10.92
263:20:17:00.1
263:20:17:00.4
263:20:20:01.7
263:20:20:02.0
263:20:41:03
NO blackout
263:21:06:26
263:21:12:52
263:21:12:52
263:21:12:52
263:21 :i 2:53
263:21:12:58.6
263:21:13:03
263:21:13:04
263:21:13:31.1
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TABLE I.- STS-64 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
"Wheels Stop
APU Deactivation
Description
Velocity with respect to runway
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Actual time, G.m.t.
263:21:13:54
263:21:29:16.53
263:21:29:17.88
263:21:29:19.03
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DOCUMENT SOURCES _
L
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data for
this mission report, the following list is provided.
1
2.
1
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10,
11.
--t2.
13.
14.
15.
Flight Requirements Document
Public Affairs Press Kit
Customer Support Room Daily Reports
MER Daily Reports
MER Mission Summary Report
MER Quick Look Report
MER Problem Tracking List
MER Event Times
Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs
MOD Systems Anomaly List
MSFC Flash Report
MSFC Event Times
MSFC Interim Report
Crew Debriefing comments
Shuttle Operational Data Book
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items
are used in this document.
AFRSI
ALC
AMOS
APFR
APU
ARPCS
ARS
ATCS
BFS
BITE
BRIC
CRT
DDHU
DEU
DOD
DSO
DTO
AV
deg/hr
EAFB
ECC
EGT
El
EMU
EPDC
ET
EVA
FCE
FCS
FES
ft/sec
g
GAS
GFE
G.m.t.
GN&C
GPC
HAINS
HDRR
HPFTP
HPOT
HPOTP
IMU
Advanced felt reusable surface insulation
automatic light control
Air Force Maul Optical Site
articulating portable foot restraint
auxiliary power unit
atmospheric revitalization pressure control system
atmospheric revitalization system
active thermal control system
backup flight system
built-in test equipment
Biological Research in Canisters
cathode ray tube
digital data handling unit
display electronics unit
Department of Defense
Detailed Supplementary Objective
Developmental Test Objective
differential velocity
degree per hour
Edwards Air Force Base
electronic cuff checklist
exhaust gas temperature
entry interface
extravehicular mobility unit
electrical power distribution and control subsystem
External Tank
extravehicular activity
flight crew equipment
flight control system
flash evaporator system
feet per second
gravity
Getaway Special
Government furnished equipment
GreenwiCh mean time
guidance, navigation and control
general purpose computer
high ac(_uracy inertial navigation syetem
high data rate recorder
high pressure fuel tUrbopump
high pressure oxidizer turbine
high preSsure oxidi_,er turbopump
inertial measurement unit
B,1
IPL
JSC
KSC
kW
kWh
LCC
LCD
LED
LES
LESC
LH2
LIDAR
LITE
LO_
LOS
LRSI
MADS
MAST
MCA
MCDS
MDM
MECO
MET
MLGD
MMU
MPESS
MPM
MPS
MSFC
MUM
NASA
NLGD
NPSP
NSTS
OI
OMR_.D
OMS
ONR
OPS
OTP
PAL
Pc
PDI
PDU
PFR
PGSC
PLBD
PMBT
POHS
initial program load
Johnson Space center
Kennedy Space Center
kiloWatt
kilowatt hour
Launch Commit Criteria
liquid crystal display
light emitting diode
launch/entry suit
Lockheed Engineering and Science Company
liquid hydrogen
light distance and ranging
Lidar In-Space TechnOlogy.Experiment
liquid oxygen
loss of signal
low temperature reusable surface insulation
modular auxiliary data system
Military Application of Ship Tracks Experiment
motor controller assembly
multifunCtion CRT display system
multiplexer/demultiplexer
main engine cutoff
mission elapsed time
main landing gear door
manned maneuvering unit
mission peculiar experiment support equipment
manipulator positioning mechanism
main propulsion system
Marshall Space Flight Oenter
MCDS update module
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nose landing gear door
net pOsitive suction pressure
NatiOnal Space Transportation System (i.e., Space Shuttle Program)
operational instrumentation
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
orbital maneuvering subsystem
Office of Naval Research
operatiOnS
operational test procedure
protuberartce air load
chamber pressure
payload data interleaver
power drive unit
portable foot restraint
payload and ground support computer
payload bay door
prop_llant mean bulk temperature
position orier_tation h0ld select
B-2
PROX OPS
PRSD
RCS
RM
RME
RMS
ROMPS
RSRM
RTLS
SAFER
SAREX
SLF
SMS
SPARTAN
SPIFEX
SRB
SRSS
SSCE
SSME
SWDLPA
TACAN
TCS
TDRS
TE
TFL
TPS
TRAD
TU
UV
UVCS
WCS
WLC
WSB
proximity operations
power reactant storage and distribution
,'eaction control subsystem
_'edundancy management
Radiation Monitoring Equipment =__.
remote manipulator system _
Robot Operated Materials ProCessing System
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
return to launch site
Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment
Shuttle Landing Facility
Shuttle Mission Simulator
Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Research Tool for Astronomy
Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment
Solid Rocket Booster
Shuttle range safety system
Solid Surface Combustion Experiment
Space Shuttle main engine
supply water dump line purge assembly
Tactical Air Navigation
Trajectory Control Sensor
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
thermoelectric
telemetry format load
thermal protection subsystem
Tools for Rendezvous and Docking
transport unit
ultraviolet
Ultraviolet COronal Spectrometer
Waste collection system
White Light Coronagraph
water spray boiler
i_i_ .
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